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Zofshan Taj
The Political Thought of Tahir-ul-Qadri 
in its Islamic Context: 
Understanding the Concept of Khilafa 
and its Relevance to Modern Society in 
Light of Medieval Islamic Teachings
IntroductIon 
Juda ho deen siyasat se, tau reh jati ha changazi (If governmental rule be-
comes devoid of religious righteousness1 then that which remains is changazi 
[ruthlessness/tyranny, referring to the time of Genghis Khan’s rule]). The above 
aphorism, as expressed by the distinguished Pakistani poet and philosopher 
Allama Iqbal, accurately summarizes the political thought of Tahir-ul-Qadri,2 
a leading Islamic thinker from Pakistan, whose work I intend to critically ex-
plore within this paper. The present work is therefore essentially an analysis of 
the Islamic political thought of Tahir-ul-Qadri on the concept of Islamic khilafa 
(rule/government) and its relevance to modern society, in comparison to medi-
eval Islamic political thought. 
The need for an Islamic state within the modern era emerged due to the 
1. Righteousness here means moral and ethical justice. 
2. Tahir-ul-Qadri was born in 1951 in Jhang, Pakistan, to Farid ud-Din Qadri who was known 
to be a prominent Pakistani scholar of his time. Qadri is the founding leader of Minhaj-ul-Quran 
International (MQI), established in 1980, “an organization with branches and centres in more than 
ninety countries around the globe.” (Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International , “A Profile of Shaykh-ul-Islam 
Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri,” Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International, http://www.minhaj.org/english/
tid/8718/A-Profile-of-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-Muhammad-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html (accessed September 
18, 2009). 
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dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Arab nationalism, which trig-
gered a galvanizing reaction across the Muslim world especially in the Indian 
subcontinent, thus introducing the idea of establishing an Islamic state which 
would solely cater for Islamic ideals of social justice.3 The impact of expansion-
ist Europe was pivotal in how it shaped the thoughts and aims of both Islamic 
modernism and fundamentalism, for both were driven by the same experience 
of Europe’s technical and military superiority.4 The negative impact of colonial-
ism created fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamist movements such as 
the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
This development within the Islamic world has summoned modern Mus-
lim intellectuals  like Tahir-ul-Qadri to explore the debate over the future role of 
the Islamic state, that is, how Islam has become a state-centric political ideology 
fit for radicals to exploit by dispossessing Islam of its moral content and dis-
daining its role as a dīn (a system of life which encompasses both religious and 
secular aspects). What makes Qadri’s political thought unique from that of any 
other modern thinker such as Sayyid Qutb (who also has much to contribute on 
the topic of khilafa and Islamic rule), is the unyielding and resolute austerity of 
his viewpoint and his ability to deploy a vast array of traditional Islamic authori-
ties across the spectrum of medieval Islamic political thought, to legitimize his 
notion of Islamic rule, and yet simultaneously hold the ability to portray Islam 
as a progressive religion able to effectively function in the modern era. Qadri is 
engaging in an intellectual debate not only with Muslims of Pakistan and Mus-
lim youth in the West, but also with Western academia. In doing so, he has chal-
lenged their views on the out-datedness of khilafa and its inability to adapt to 
contemporary society. 
This paper shall seek to relate Qadri’s modern political thought on the 
Islamic state to the historical view of khilafa and assess how the socio-political 
3. L.F. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), 127. 
4. Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 279. 
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context, which he was exposed to in Pak-
istan, influenced his political thought, 
and to what extent Western political 
thought has affected his view on the 
future role of the Islamic state. To this 
extent, the present work may challenge 
the notion that modern Islamic politi-
cal thought on khilafa is solely based on 
medieval Islamic teachings. To the con-
trary, it may be the present global world 
order and influence of the Western state 
system which has more so affected mod-
ern Islamic political thought. 
A Modern InterpretAtIon 
of khilafa: UnderstAndIng 
terMInology 
And eradIcAtIng 
MIsconceptIons 
There is no one specific vision of the Islamic state and this is very much 
apparent in the views of both medieval and modern Islamic political thinkers, 
most obviously because there is no common consensus among them on the 
general structure and role of the Islamic state. The reason for such disparity may 
be due to the nature of Shari‘a (Islamic law based on the Qur’an and Sunnah), 
which is perceived to be like a vast ocean that knows no bounds, and the Islamic 
state itself is alleged to be an ideological state; its main purpose being the imple-
mentation of the will of God. How one goes about fulfilling this task will vary 
because Shari‘a is an open system of law which has no conceptual or theoreti-
cal closure; it is constantly evolving due to the use of ijtihad (a methodological 
term within the context of Shari‘a which describes the process of independently 
Shaykh-ul-Islam Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri 
(Minhaj-ul-Quran International)
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interpreting the Qur’an and Sunnah in order to make a legal decision or ruling. 
Consequently it may be argued that Shari‘a takes the role of an overarch-
ing umbrella which determines the characteristics of the Islamic state. The ad-
vantage of this is that the Islamic state can change and adapt to circumstance. 
A plausible disadvantage may be that within the same time period, more than 
one concept of the Islamic state could arise.5 Such discrepancy is evident in the 
writings of many medieval Islamic thinkers. Analyzing the thoughts of think-
ers like Mawardi, Ibn Khaldun and Ibn Taymiyya6 upon the concept of khilafa 
will consequently enable one to understand the affect medieval Islamic political 
thought has had on modern scholars such as Tahir-ul-Qadri, thereby forming 
a comparison between modern and medieval Islamic political thought on the 
Islamic state. 
Before moving on to explore Tahir-ul-Qadri’s view of the Islamic state, it 
is worth pausing for a moment to consider and briefly shed some light on his 
political career (essentially based in Pakistan), for this, to some extent, would 
have influenced his thoughts on khilafa and the role of the Islamic state in the 
contemporary era. Qadri’s political career began in 1989 when he founded the 
Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT), his own political party, and was elected as a 
member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, representing his constituency of 
Lahore, Pakistan. However, after many years of working as an opposition leader 
in the National Assembly, Qadri decided to issue his resignation from the As-
5. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (London: I.B. Taurus, 1994), 9. Em-
ploying more than one concept of the Islamic state is different from having a plurality of co-existing 
states. While the latter may not cause conflict, separate outlooks on the role and purpose of a single 
Islamic state can. 
6. While there are many medieval Muslim scholars who have written on the Islamic state, the focal 
point of interest for the present work shall lay in the teachings of the above mentioned three schol-
ars, essentially because they reflect the broad spectrum of varying opinion on the Islamic state which 
was prevalent within the tradition of medieval Islamic political thought, and all three scholars were 
from different time periods within the medieval era and thus reflect the changing trend of Islamic 
political thought. 
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sembly in 2004.7 
This resignation was issued in the form of a comprehensive critique of 
the Pakistani political system. He declared in his resignation statement that “in 
my understanding, this Assembly is no longer an assembly. The role which the 
Pakistani constitution has given to the Assembly is not exercised by it. This As-
sembly does not have its own agenda; it works for the personal agendas of the 
originators of this Assembly.”8 It was not made clear during his interview with 
the Pakistani news channel PTV of whom precisely Tahir-ul-Qadri was refer-
ring when he spoke of the “originators.”9 Yet as Qadri explained in his resigna-
tion statement, the essential function of an assembly is to discuss the domestic 
and international issues of a nation and make decisions in accordance with the 
needs of that nation. Such functions, according to Qadri, are not being carried 
out by the Pakistani government. He makes a very important point regarding 
the internal functioning of the Pakistani government in stating that there has 
been no significant discussion on important geopolitical and regional issues 
such as eliminating terrorism or Pakistan’s international relations. What has 
been discussed is the simple and meaningless drafting of legislation which will 
inevitably be passed without one’s consent; in other words, handling small is-
sues of no affect. No doubt the obvious implication which Qadri has made here 
is a lack of sovereignty.
One of the fundamental root causes, as noted by Tahir-ul-Qadri, which 
has led to such situations as described above and has hindered so-called modern 
Islamic states like Pakistan from effectively governing their populace is a basic 
inability to understand the very nature of Islam as a dīn as opposed to a religion 
7. Tahir-ul-Qadri, “Statement of Resignation from Pakistan National Assembly,” Minhaj-ul-Quran 
Publications, http://www.minhaj.org/images-db/resignation-eng.pdf (accessed July 12, 2011). 
8. “Dr. Tahir ul Qadri’s Interview with Dr. Moeed Pirzada on PTV Prime’s World (1/6),” YouTube 
video, 8:56, from an interview with Shaykh-ul-Islam Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri hosted by Dr. 
Moeed Pirzada and televised on PTV Prime’s World Today (Pakistan Television), uploaded by min-
hajorg, March 5, 2009,  http://youtu.be/HEeipfjH5_o (accessed April 15, 2010).
9. Ibid.
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in the Western sense of the term. On being questioned regarding his motive be-
hind the formation of the Minhaj-ul-Quran movement in 1980, Tahir-ul-Qadri 
mentioned in an interview, that the fundamental reason for his establishing this 
organization was a need to address and correct the misconception of Islam as a 
religion, in the Western sense of the term’s meaning, as opposed to dīn.10 
Dīn is a concept alien to Western political policy due to the almost uni-
form separation of state and church. Many Islamic organizations, in Qadri’s view, 
make the mistake of limiting their aim to focusing only on the religious aspects 
of life. There is consequently no emphasis on secular education or development. 
Thus, the global perspective of Islam is seen as being grounded in religious as-
pects of Shari‘a only. This has caused problems in understanding what Islamic 
knowledge consists of and what the basic role of the Islamic state should be. 
Those who have extensive knowledge on Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) and other 
religious aspects of life are sometimes ignorant of modern subjects such as po-
litical science, economics, and so on. They are, therefore, often unqualified for 
providing the direction and leadership necessary to resolve political or socio-
economic predicaments, even in light of their knowledge of Islam. This evalua-
tion can also be applied in the case of those who do possess secular knowledge 
and are aware of today’s political issues and circumstance, but are ignorant of 
the Islamic position in such matters. They do not know how to view current 
issues from a religious point of view; their knowledge is based in non-Islamic, 
Western teaching.
Tahir-ul-Qadri believes that deeni taleem (dīn education) and mazhabi 
taleem (religious education) are two different concepts. Mazhabi taleem essen-
tially concentrates on education which concerns the study of classical Islamic 
texts, Hadith and Quranic studies, Islamic theology, fiqh (jurisprudence), and 
so forth, without placing much emphasis on the implications of such studies 
upon the secular aspects of life. Deeni taleem, on the other hand, is an all-encom-
10. Ibid.
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passing totality which incorporates both mazhabi taleem (religious education) 
and dunyavi taleem (secular education).11 It implements Shari‘a into one’s practi-
cal life by integrating teachings taken from classical Islamic texts and making 
them applicable to present social, economic, and political circumstances. In this 
way, Qadri argues that Islam is unlike Christianity and Judaism; it is a dīn. This 
is important to take into consideration when contemplating the fundamental 
format and functions of the Islamic state. The message which Qadri is trying to 
convey is plain: a true Islamic state cannot be formed with a misconception of 
the basic nature of the Islamic system. Islam must first be understood for what it 
truly is – a dīn as opposed to a religion. 
In viewing the modern perception of Islam, that is, how the Islamic state 
would function in modern society, in light of this concept of dīn, Tahir-ul-Qadri 
emphasizes the practicality of Islam as a functioning system, applicable to all 
times. He views Shari‘a as a system with no conceptual closure due to its con-
stant evolution over time. Qadri explains that there are two aspects to Islam: 
First, the basic structure and fundamental principles of Islam, which are con-
stant and unchanging. In this he makes reference to the Qur’an and Sunnah, 
which are an abadi hidaayat (eternal guidance). The second, he claims, is man-
made law which, with the graduation of time, becomes outdated due to man’s 
inability to perceive and envision the changes which society shall face.12 In soci-
ety, man-made laws change with circumstance in order for man to survive and 
meet the changes encountered. He thinks Islamic knowledge has been able to 
fulfill man’s needs to date due to ijtihad, the adaptable element in Islamic law. 
Legislation through ijtihad permits new interpretations according to changing 
circumstance, which is supported by the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
11. Ibid. 
12. “Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri Interview: What is the Modern Perception of Islam,” YouTube video, 6:57, 
from an interview with Shaykh-ul-Islam Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, uploaded by islamicmulti-
media, October 21, 2008, http://youtu.be/uPjBE17Xpns (accessed April 11, 2010).
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Qadri gives the example of the “four schools of thought,”13 each of which 
lays its foundation in Shari‘a. Consequently, any rules made within the different 
schools will not conflict the integral law of Shari‘a. Hence the same basic princi-
ples can be used and interpreted in different ways to seek and fulfill the different 
needs in society according to the philosophies of each school. Qadri describes 
ijtihad as a device which allows for a “reconstructive spirit” to be prevalent with-
in Shari‘a, while preventing Islam from becoming an outdated dīn in the future. 
Explaining this concept of dīn and its relevance to modernity is vital for 
understanding Qadri’s definition of khilafa, since the latter could only be made 
clear when explained in light of the correct understanding of dīn. When explain-
ing the true concept of khilafa, Tahir-ul-Qadri clarifies that “the political author-
ity of the Muslim Ummah (community) whatever the shape or form has been 
given the nomenclature of khilafa.”14 So, khilafa denotes Islamic rule or govern-
ment. However, when taken in its most literal sense the term khilafa may be 
defined as niyaabah (trusteeship) and amaanah (vicegerency). 
This form of vicegerency is not restricted to the political sense, as is evi-
dent in the varying references made to the term khilafa within the Qur’an. In 
Surah Hadid (Qur’an 57:7), the economic sense of the term is used: “Believe 
in Allah and His Messenger (blessings and peace be upon him) and spend (in 
His cause) out of that (wealth) in which He has made you His vicegerents (and 
trustees).”15 This, according to Tahir-ul-Qadri, is “istikhlaaf fil-‘maal” (economic 
vicegerency); being a trustee or khalifa of God’s wealth or maal (to spend it in 
the right way and use it for good deeds).16 In Surah Nur (Qur’an 24:55) reference 
to the political sense of leadership and government is made, which Qadri refers 
13. These are the four schools of fiqh (jurisprudence) within Sunni Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i 
and Hanbali); each named after a medieval scholar who began that specific school of jurisprudence.  
14. Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State: True Concept and Eradication of Misconceptions, DVD, Eng-
lish (Lahore: Minhaj-ul-Quran International , 2010).
15. Qur’an 57:7 (Irfan-ul-Quran: English translation of Qur’an by Tahir-ul-Qadri). 
16. Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State, DVD.
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to as “istikhlaaf fil-Siyasah” (political vicegerency): “He will surely bestow upon 
them Khilafa (the trust of right to rule) as He granted (the right to) rule to those 
who were before them.”17 Khilafa in relation to government (political vicege-
rency) would therefore indicate the rule of man on earth as God’s vicegerent. 
The varying economic and political usages of the term khilafa confirm that the 
underlying concept of khilafa as vicegerency is applicable in all aspects of life; 
hence, supporting the definition of Islam as an all-encompassing dīn. 
In agreement with the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya,18 Qadri views kh-
ilafa as an underlying concept with no specific form. Although Ibn Taymiyya 
did not express concern over the need to establish an ideological Islamic state, 
he did however disagree with the belief that the Qur’an has issued a given con-
stitution which outlines the precise format of the ideal Islamic state. In doing so, 
Tamiyya removed Quranic legitimacy from the traditional claim of the theory 
of khilafa. The state was only significant in that it institutionalized the preemi-
nence of Islam by establishing religious norms in society. For Ibn Taymiyya, the 
Islamic state need not be visualized in a specific form with particular physical 
characteristics, on the condition that the state put into practice the fundamental 
principle of implementing God’s will.
Likewise, Qadri agrees that there have been many changes over time in the 
basic nature of political rule (monarchic, aristocratic, democratic) and this has 
resulted in many political developments in human society (federations, unitary 
governments, presidential systems, parliamentary systems, and so on). In light 
of this, any state can be an Islamic state, on the condition that the policy made 
by the state and the principles upon which it is governed are positively in accor-
dance with Shari‘a law. In pursuit of this, all state policies must be made under 
17. Qur’an 24:55 (Irfan-ul-Quran). 
18. Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328 CE) lived in the time period during which the Mongols invaded 
the Muslim world. Having to flee his homeland as a refugee Ibn Taymiyya naturally felt hostility 
towards the Mongol rulers who eventually embraced Islam. He however denounced the Mongols as 
unbelievers by asserting that they still followed parts of the Yasa code, which were non-Islamic, and 
had therefore not adopted Shari‘a in its entirety. 
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the shade of Islamic supremacy, and must be subservient to Shari‘a . Qadri ex-
plains that “the different forms of government are just various mechanisms and 
suitabilities.”19 These are ijtihaadi, that is, matters with no specific law or ruling 
on them, which may change with circumstance. 
Qadri thus defines khilafa as a system with an open structure, and refers 
to this system of Islamic rule as “khilafat-e-Illahi,” for which the English equiva-
lent is theocracy. However, he also notes that there is a fundamental difference 
between Islamic theocracy and the Western theocracy of the past. The form of 
theocracy which is known to Islam is fundamentally different from the theoc-
racy of medieval Europe, wherein a religious priestly class exercised unchecked 
authority by implementing and legalizing laws in God’s name. Islamic theocracy, 
on the other hand, is not governed by a particular group of religious elites; the 
input of the entire Islamic community is required for it to function. The Islamic 
state system can, therefore, be termed a ‘theo-democracy’ due to the element 
of divine legislation, which attributes the Islamic state with a limited popular 
sovereignty. The Islamic government is a democracy in the sense that all such 
issues, in which there is no direct ruling of divine law, can be resolved through 
ijtihad. However, on those issues for which there is a specific law, it must be 
obeyed. This mandate reveals its theocratic nature in the sense that this rule or 
law either in the Qur’an or Sunnah cannot be repealed or overruled by man-
made law, whether the latter is formed by a learned jurist or a common man. 
While this may be seen as an infringement upon one’s freedom and lib-
erty, one may argue that God has taken the right to legislate law not to restrict 
man’s freedom, but to safeguard and protect it. Hence God has imposed divine 
limits in certain cases which may be regulated according to circumstance, but 
not overruled. The commonality between Islamic jamuriyya (democracy) and 
non-Islamic jamuriyya is that the majority opinion is respected in both cases. 
The difference is that in Islamic jamuriyya the majority opinion cannot amend, 
19. Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State, DVD.
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appeal, or abrogate Shari‘a law . Sanctity of the vote does not mean abrogation 
of Shari‘a . This is the condition; this is khilafa. 
The deliberate ambiguity in the structural nature of Islamic government 
and rule is further reflected in the example of the prophet, Muhammad, who 
decided to leave the appointment of the next khalifa (leader of Islamic com-
munity) open to the ummah rather than nominating the next leader himself. 
This, according to Qadri, was so that the opportunity for political development 
would not be lost and the doors opened to ijtihad would not be closed. This also 
shows that the specific format of leadership was not so important for Muham-
mad to give a precise one; he left this open to the ummah, and consequently 
declared this to be an “ijtihaadi matter.”20
Tahir-ul-Qadri sees this as evident in the different methods of election 
or appointment experienced during the time of rule of the Khulfa-e-rashideen 
(four rightly-guided khalifas)21. In a similar manner to the medieval theologian 
Ibn Khaldun,22 Qadri attributes a democratic significance to the medieval meth-
ods of election and nomination, by introducing the concept of bay‘a as a form 
of vote.23 Ibn Khaldun in his Muqaddimah explained the concept of bay‘a (an 
oath of allegiance to the ruler) as a means to formalize one’s contract with one’s 
ruler; “they put their hands into his hand to confirm the contract.”24 In a similar 
way, taking the example of the election of Uthman (the third khalifa), Qadri de-
scribes how there was a difference of opinion on who should be the next khalifa 
and many had directly approached Ali to do bay‘a on his hands, yet he refused, 
20. Ibid. 
21. The four rightly-guided khalifas were the successors of the Prophet Muhammad and represen-
tatives of the Muslim community after him; namely Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthman ibn 
Affan, and Ali ibn Abi Talib.
22. Born in 1332 CE, Khaldun was a medieval Islamic scholar and theologian who lived in a North 
African tribal society during a period of decline for Islam. 
23. Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State, DVD.
24. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1958), 428.
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stating that this matter is the right of the shura (Parliament) to decide.  
Two points are to be noted here: First, bay‘a is giving your opinion, cast-
ing your vote, consenting to choose or appoint someone as your representative 
or as head of the state. At that time there was no procedure involving ballot pa-
pers or ballot boxes. So the people would express their opinion and consent in 
the form of bay‘a, which was not just a process or part of khilafa, but rather was 
a common method of declaring your intention, will, and commitment to some-
thing or someone. In the political sense, bay‘a was an expression of opinion on a 
potential leader. Qadri thus considers voting to be the modern form of bay‘a.25 
Secondly, the shura during the life of Muhammad was a parliament con-
sisting of representatives for the community, from the community, who dis-
cussed issues related to the community. It was divided between two houses: 
shura-e-khaas (special house) and shura-e-a’am (general house). Of course, one 
must mention here that parliament is an English word, which cannot be found 
in any translation of the Qur’an or Sunnah. The fundamental point to remember 
is that the shura is a house of representatives comprised of senior community 
members who have been elected or appointed by the community. 
 In the case of Uthman’s election, both the shura-e-khaas and shura-e-a’am 
seemed to be equally divided on the issue of whether to elect Uthman or Ali. 
Hence, a final decision was to be made by the general approval of the commu-
nity. This, according to Qadri, was done in the form of a referendum by the 
“chief election commissioner,” Abdul Rahman bin Auf. Again, although this 
specific title is not mentioned in any Hadith,26 Qadri explains that one might 
find the title chief election commission helpful considering the responsibilities of 
Abdul Rahman bin Auf, which were to conduct the election, get the opinions of 
the people, and obtain their votes by consulting them. It is important to place 
25. Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State, DVD.
26. Hadith are narrative compilations of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, and are 
extensively used within Islamic jurisprudence and to get a better understanding of the teachings of 
the Qur’an. 
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emphasis upon the function, not the specific term itself, for the difference in 
Arabic and English cannot render the concept Islamic or un-Islamic. He was 
appointed for istiswaab-ul-a’am, which Tahir-ul-Qadri interprets to mean ‘gen-
eral election’ or referendum, since every sane and senior member was consulted 
from the community. Through this referendum, Uthman was appointed as the 
third khalifa. He was not appointed with the bay‘a of the shura, he was appointed 
by the direct vote and opinion of the citizens, on the basis of adult franchise 
(common vote of the people). 
This interpretation of Qadri’s can be seen as contrasting that of Mawardi’s,27 
whose theory of khilafa required that only those authorized to elect could do 
so, for Abu Bakr was initially elected only by five persons.28 It is interesting to 
note that Mawardi has used Abu Bakr’s election method as a means to condone 
the need for popular consent. In contrast to Mawardi, Tahir-ul-Qadri sees the 
elective method of Uthman as signifying how important it was to consult the 
jamhoor (majority opinion). Qadri has therefore used the very same examples 
of the elective methods of the khulafa-e-rashideen to support approval of the use 
of popular consent. 
Regarding the notion that there should be one khalifa and Islamic head 
for the whole world, Qadri agrees with Ibn Khaldun who approved of the si-
multaneous existence of more than one imam (who need not be of Qureshi29 
descent), on the condition that they administer in different and vastly separated 
27. Mawardi, a native of Basra, born in 972 CE, was a judge by profession in Baghdad. He be-
longed to the Sunni Shaf ’ai School of jurisprudence, although he was often known to play the devil’s 
advocate when disputes arose between the Shi’ite Buwayhids and the Abbasids. The bulk of his 
Islamic political thought is found in his al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah (Ordinances of Government), which 
were written with the intent of re-asserting the lost authority of the Abbasid Khilafa. About this lat-
ter point, see Erwin, I.J. Rosenthal, Political thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1958), 27. 
28. Qamaruddin Khan, Al-Mawardi’s Theory of the State (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 
1983), iv. Mawardi also believed that the imam (ruler) must be of “Qureshi” descent. See Ibn Khal-
dun, Muqaddimah, 428.
29. The Qureshi people were members of the Qureish Tribe, the leading tribe of Makkah during 
the appearance and rise of Islam. 
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geographical territories, thus making communication difficult between prov-
inces. One may thus conclude that Ibn Khaldun approved of the nation-state: an 
independent territorially bound province consisting of a community bound by 
the unifying force of asabiyya.30 
Similarly, Qadri also explains that if the Muslim ummah unite anywhere, 
create a society and install a head from among them, this would be khilafa. He 
further explains that the inability of Muslims to establish khilafa is due to their 
persistence on wrongly interpreting the concept of ummah. For Qadri the ba-
sic reason for the establishment of the Islamic state is so as to maintain iltizam 
al-jam’mah (organized collectivity), be it one state or a plurality of states. To 
this extent he again agrees with Ibn Khaldun on the necessity of maintaining 
asabiyya within the community to keep it intact, for which a social contract— 
although established in theory by Western thinkers such as Rousseau, Hobbes 
and Locke—is a common need for all humans, be they citizens of a Muslim 
or non-Muslim country. An organized society fulfilling certain conditions with 
certain characteristics is a state.31 
Muhammad is purported to have said that if there are three Muslims trav-
eling together, they should appoint one of them as their amir (leader). This ha-
dith was used by Ibn Taymiyya to legitimize submission to tyrannical rule, for 
despite his antagonism towards the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya believed in the im-
portance of obeying a ruler in order to maintain stability in society. 32 He granted 
30. See Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, 372. Khaldun describes asabiyya in his Muqaddimah as a 
cohesive force or a feeling of group solidarity which is narrowed into one particular person from that 
group, who takes the position of authority and moves towards kingship. He saw dynasties as having 
a cycle of growth and decline which lasts for three generations. Dynasties are strongest when the 
feeling of asabiyya is at its peak in the first generation. In the second generation this group feeling is 
diluted to some extent due to  “proud superiority” on the part of the ruler, who is living under the 
illusion that the conditions of asabiyya are the same, yet a gradual shift of loyalty is noticed. In the 
third generation, the dynasty faces complete annihilation due to the absence of asabiyya and the reli-
ance on external support rather than support from within the group or community itself.
31. Tahir-ul-Qadri, The Islamic State, DVD.
32. Emmanuel Sivan, “Ibn Taymiyya: Father of the Islamic Revolution, Medieval Theology and 
Modern Politics,” Encounter 60, no.3 (1989): 41–4. 
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his approval for the need to follow the ruler no matter what his political temper-
ament and reasons for holding power may be and defended this rather despotic 
view by exploiting the hadith that “sixty years of rule under a tyrant Imam is 
better than a night without an Imam.”33 He also supported this claim by making 
reference to the above mentioned Hadith regarding the three travellers. 
Qadri on the other hand, uses this Hadith to make an altogether different 
claim: that by stating this, Muhammad never declared that there should only be 
one amir, imam, sultan or khalifa in the entire world. In light of this interpreta-
tion, Muhammad’s philosophy was the establishment of khilafa wherever one is. 
Since the basic reason for the state is to protect its citizens, neither law nor order 
could be established if all Muslims, who live thousands of miles away from one 
another, were under worldwide leadership; that is, the basic needs and necessi-
ties of citizens could not be fulfilled. Practically, there should be one khalifa in 
each place, and one khalifa for each society, thus providing an alternate meaning 
of the word one in the Hadith regarding the three travelers. 
Tahir-ul-Qadri provides, as an example, the first state established by Mu-
hammad in Madinah (Medina), which was a state established solely for Madi-
nah, thereby supporting the notion of a territorial state. Since this state exclud-
ed the people of Thul Hulaifa, who were an independent Muslim community 
situated between Madinah and Makkah (Mecca), the former did not fall under 
Muhammad’s authority in the same way as the latter and had its own indepen-
dent political entity. Furthermore, the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah34 did not bind the 
people of Thul Hulaifa nor even apply to them. One may consequently infer 
from this that Tahir-ul-Qadri, in agreement with Ibn Khaldun, understands the 
concept of nation-state, or to the idea of having more than one Islamic leader, as 
33. Qamar-ud Din Khan, The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyya (Islamabad: Islamic Research 
Institute, 1973), 31. 
34. After a series of lengthy battles between the Muslims led by the Prophet Muhammad and the 
Pagans of Makkah, a treaty for peaceful coexistence was signed between the Muslims and the Tribe 
of Qureish (who were Pagans at the time and still ruled the City of Makkah) for ten years.  
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fundamental in Islam.
A contrasting view to this perspective would be that of Mawardi who did 
not agree with there being more than one imam, and was thus against the view 
that Islam can undergo a geographical divide. He argued that two imams cannot 
rule simultaneously and thus held to a pan-Islamic global view of khilafa. It is 
possible that Mawardi held to this view in order to declare unlawful the Buway-
hid rule, as well as what remained of the Umayyad dynasty in Spain during his 
era. The idea that there may be a separate Turkish Islam, Iranian Islam, and Arab 
Islam as we have today would thus have been implausible for Mawardi. 
conclusIon: A PlAusIble WAy ForWArd
As mentioned earlier, there is no one specific perception of the Islamic 
state in terms of its role and functioning. From among the works of the medieval 
theologians/scholars analyzed within this paper, one could argue that Mawar-
di’s view of the Islamic state could be likened to that of a despotic-aristocracy, 
whereas Ibn Khaldun took a more democratic approach to the monarchical sys-
tem of rule, and Ibn Taymiyya, although not declaring any preference, did sug-
gest the need for popular consent. However, if taken to the extreme his views 
can also be seen as anarchical and somewhat despotic. The reason for such dif-
ferences is essentially due to the socio-political and historical contexts which 
each of the medieval thinkers were exposed to. For Mawardi, it was a case of 
balancing authority between the two poles of Sunnism and Shi’ism, whereas for 
Ibn Khaldun it was a matter of reviving lost morale and power of the North Af-
rican tribal system and for Ibn Taymiyya, it was neither an issue of balance nor 
revival, but rather that of rebellion against external influence and control from 
the Mongols. However, one commonality which is seen in the thoughts of all 
three scholars and which united their ultimate purpose for the establishment of 
the Islamic state was the need to implement the will of God by enforcing Shari‘a 
into one’s practical life.  
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It is precisely this aim which unites Qadri’s view of the Islamic State to 
the views of the medieval theologians; to implement Shari‘a into one’s life as 
a dīn. Qadri has consequently proposed a plausible way forward in order for 
the Islamic state to survive and progress in modern society. He believes that 
the failed Islamic states of today are in need of fikri-inkilaab (intellectual or ide-
ational revolution). Giving the example of Pakistan as one among many failed 
Islamic states of the contemporary era, Qadri believes that Pakistani culture and 
people as yet have not adopted the culture of democracy, and so it is necessary 
for the institutions to have power rather than the politicians, in order to avoid 
corruption. A similar observation can also be made for other Islamic states pri-
marily within the near and Middle East, such as Egypt and Sudan. Qadri argues 
that there is no democracy in the societies of such states, whether in homes, at 
school or in the functioning of the government. Democracy has not been estab-
lished in the state as a psyche and culture. This intellectual revolution, therefore, 
needs to be approached from various angles: educational, theological and ide-
ational, in order to establish a moderate peaceful view of Islam and a culture of 
democracy.35
This is why Qadri has called for the need of socio-economic developments 
to remove poverty in Pakistan, and make education inexpensive and accessible 
to all. Education has unfortunately become an industry, a trade in Pakistan. The 
poor have no access to good quality education even in state institutions, and 
private education is too expensive. The only means of education available to 
them is through the madrasa,36 where a student is given free food and clothing 
in order to reduce expenses. The poor do not care about where their children’s 
education will lead them, as long as they have food and clothing. Whether one 
is being trained to become a peaceful citizen or a terrorist is not significant; for 
35. Tahir-ul-Qadri, My Life, My Mission, DVD (lecture, February 18, 2004, Lahore, Pakistan: Min-
haj ul-Quran Publications, 2004).
36. The term madrasa generally means “school.” However, in this context the term is specifically 
referring to the religious schools within Islamic countries such as Pakistan which solely cater for 
Islamic education. 
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them their economic deadlock has been resolved.  
Qadri has consequently proposed a system similar to that which is com-
mon in the Western welfare state systems in order to eliminate poverty and re-
duce extremism. He explains how the Islamic dīn has become enclosed within 
the bounds of religion and handed over to the madrasa. It was not always like 
this, he says, worldly and religious knowledge were given equal importance and 
from this same fountain of knowledge dispersed the Ghazalis, Ibn Rushds, sci-
entists and scholars. Now the division between the two has created two differ-
ent and separate perceptions of life. There is, therefore, a fundamental need to 
amalgamate the two and to end the hatred of modern secular thinkers towards 
Islam, by putting an end to this religious stereotype of Islam.37 
According to Bernard Lewis, foreign policy being a product of the Eu-
ropean imagination is alien to the Islamic world, due to the distinction Islam 
makes between the Dar al-Islam (abode of Islamic territorial world) and Dar 
al-Harb (abode of the non-Islamic territorial world).38 This is further empha-
sized by Ehteshami, who argues that Islam has a minimal role to play within the 
global world order and international relations, since the international order is 
dominated by secular states who exclude religion from any active participation 
in the political governing of state relations.39 
In light of such views, Qadri, seeing the Organization of the Islamic Con-
ference (OIC) as ineffective and an inadequate representative of Muslim states 
within the global arena, has proposed a plausible solution to improving the role 
of the Islamic state in international relations. He proposes that the future success 
of the Muslim ummah can be achieved through the means of a union similar to 
37. “Dr. Tahir ul Qadri’s Interview with Dr. Moeed Pirzada on PTV Prime’s World (1/6),” You-
Tube video, 8:56, March 5, 2009, http://youtu.be/HEeipfjH5_o (accessed April 20, 2010).
38. James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-states (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 42. 
39. A. Ehteshami and A. S. Sidahmed, Islamic Fundamentalism (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), 
76. 
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that of the European Union. Qadri stresses that there is a need to progress to-
wards the idea of a Muslim economic community by opening trade zones within 
the international Muslim ummah and creating a world Islamic bank (or global 
Muslim bank), and wherever cooperation within regions is possible, forming 
common defense alliances. Whoever is able among a few leading states in Mus-
lim countries can lead into this development and form a global funding system 
for the creation of this type of international community by opening up markets 
to each other in order to help strengthen one another’s economies, social sta-
tuses, and to bring democracy into their societies.40 This may be accomplished 
by binding the nations under the umbrella figure of the Muslim ummah, with 
the Islamic states ultimately retaining their separate identities.  
Consensus is at the heart of Islamic doctrine and the circumstance in 
which we find ourselves today as a result of globalization has made it all the 
more easy for Islam to achieve its goal of creating a truly global community of 
independent Islamic states. Similar to Qadri’s theory of a global Muslim um-
mah, El-Affendi in Who Needs an Islamic State? suggests that “an Islamic ter-
ritory must be governed by a pluralistic polity of coexisting but independent 
communities, governed by treaties rather than a constitution.”41 This, he argues, 
“is less ambitious than a khilafat and falls well short of the building of an EU-
type union of Muslim states, but could lead to it eventually.”42 
40. “1/7: Terrorism & Foreign Policy of Pakistan by Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri - Interview with PJ Mir of ARY-News,” 
YouTube video,  10:47, an interview with Shaykh-ul-Islam Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri on terrorism 
and foreign policy of Pakistan hosted by PJ Mir on Ary News on Pakistani Television, February 1, 
2010, uploaded by minhajorg, February 2, 2010,http://youtu.be/ nz15U9ZQ0Yw (accessed April 
20, 2010).
41. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Who Needs an Islamic State? 2nd ed. (London: Malaysia Think Tank, 
2008), 138. 
42. Ibid., 33. 
